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ABSTRACT
The present paper presents compulsory notifi cation data for infectious diseases and epidemiologic 
ones recorded at the Center for Strategic Information and Health Surveillance (CIEVS) for the pe-
riod of March 2006 to April 2007. Data is presented in accordance with geographic distribution, time 
and risk classifi cation of the etiologic agents found, according to Ministry of Health regulations. 
The importance of this epidemiologic surveillance system is presented, debating the main topics 
required for quality improvement and information analysis. It is concluded, from the analysis of epi-
demiologic events and their relation to risk management, that the compulsory notifi cation system 
in Brazil is incomplete, irregular, delayed and, in a large percentage of cases, notifi cation cannot be 
completed and the agent may not be identifi ed. Quality of data varies from one region to another 
and from county to county within the same region. There is a high proportion of cases in which the 
etiologic agent is unknown and, in such cases, a high lethality is expected, establishing a high risk 
exposure condition for those health professionals involved in health surveillance. From these data, 
the study points out the need to improve the surveillance system and strengthens the idea of building 
maximum containment laboratories.
Keywords: biosafety, epidemiologic surveillance, infectious diseases, public health.
[Braz J Infect Dis 2010;14(5):526-535]©Elsevier Editora Ltda.
INTRODUCTION
Biosafety appears in a globalized world as an 
increasingly necessary fi eld of knowledge to re-
spond to the complexity presented particularly 
by biological risk, from the reality of emerging 
and re-emerging infectious diseases, bioterror-
ism, environmental predation, and commit-
ment to ecological heritage of the planet and its 
equilibrium. These aspects are associated with 
the circulation process of people and goods, 
migratory ﬂ ows, poverty, wars, transportation, 
among others, depicting a context which places 
important and complex challenges to public 
health and, especially, to epidemiology.
The risk associated with new etiological agents 
of high lethality, which may turn into pandemic 
events, either known and/or poorly known, is a 
growing concern.1 Analyses on the theme state 
that there is a latent risk linked to the circulation 
of viruses, which can, within a few hours, reach 
continents simultaneously, through air trips, 
thereby dispersing lethal biological agents and 
demanding effective epidemiological surveil-
lance systems from governments, by setting up 
laboratory networks and notifi cation systems 
as part of an effective biosafety infrastructure.2-5 
The challenges placed on public health have been 
discussed, notwithstanding that in terms of glo-
bal concerns; they entail factors confi guring the 
construction of worldwide calamity implemen-
tation.6 Among these challenges, implementation 
of Biosafety has also been placed as a fi eld which 
encompasses the complexity of risk monitoring 
and its articulation with health surveillance.
Countries have been assigning priority 
to preventive and control actions in order to 
avoid or minimize the effects of infectious dis-
eases, through surveillance-geared policies, on 
epidemiological, laboratory and clinical basis.7
The effi ciency of epidemiological surveil-
lance programs requires the setting of an in-
frastructure essential for information systems, 
enabling them to establish a strategy based 
on a warning and rapid response mecha-
nism: the setting up of a laboratory network, 
organized in a hierarchical manner, appro-
priately equipped, with qualifi ed human re-
sources, able to ensure the necessary biosafety 
Este é um artigo Open Access sob a licença de CC BY-NC-ND
527Braz J Infect Dis 2010; 14(5):526-535
conditions.8,9 Investments in these areas nowadays present 
theirselves as imperatives for the countries as in the effective-
ness and effi ciency of risk control, especially biological one, 
depending on prevention policies, with continuous aware-
ness of the changes in the habitual patterns of diseases and 
in the emergence of others.10
Brazilian endeavors on biosafety 
In order to develop a surveillance strategy based on clinical 
and laboratory epidemiologic data, in 1995, the Scientifi c 
and Technologic Development Coordination of the Bra-
zilian Ministry of Health conducted a workshop aimed at 
discussing the Brazilian Scientifi c and Technologic Capacity 
Building Project for Emerging and Re-Emerging Infectious 
Diseases, where the common thought was to increase human 
resources abilities of Brazilian institutions in the fi eld, since 
biosafety would be a priority issue in any process, whether 
with regard to facilities improvement or to change of behav-
ior based on new information.11
The main challenge turned out to be how to work these 
issues out. It was necessary to know the real conditions of the 
country’s institutions when it comes to quality in Biosafety. To 
this end, a Biosafety Offi ce (NUBio) of Oswaldo Cruz Foun-
dation (FIOCRUZ), which had already been carrying out a 
survey on the risks, was contacted, and in 1996, a Scientifi c 
and Technological Capacity Building Program in the Biosafe-
ty Field was implemented.
This Program had two basic axes of action: risk identifi ca-
tion and mapping, and capacity building of human resources 
focusing on the main gaps identifi ed on the survey. The Public 
Health Laboratories (LACEN) from the states of São Paulo, 
Minas Gerais, Pernambuco, Pará and Bahia took an active role 
in the study, as well as FIOCRUZ regional research centers. 
The main results of this survey were identifi ed as awareness 
of the issue of some 900 health workers who participate in 
courses and creating biosafety internal committees in the in-
stitutions involved.12 
In the year 2000, the Brazilian Public Health Laborato-
ries Coordination (CGLAB), today part of the Health Sur-
veillance Secretariat (SVS), has, in cooperation with the 
Centers for Disease Control/EUA and Nubio/FIOCRUZ, set 
up a capacity building program aimed at training multiplier 
subjects in biosafety. According to this group’s view, biosafe-
ty issues go far beyond genetic manipulation and its ethical 
issues, limited to a small sample of highly specialized labora-
tories or facilities. Funding of laboratories belonging to the 
National Public Health Network was set up as a priority. This 
net is composed of LACEN, linked to the State’s Secretariat 
of Health (SES) and by reference institutions linked to the 
MS, such as FIOCRUZ and Pasteur Institute (SP). These labs 
are responsible for most of disease diagnosis under surveil-
lance and, therefore, use techniques for handling infectious 
agents that may be considered routinely risky. 
Within the three strategies, the following main areas 
of action were generally defi ned: continued education for 
college and technical level personnel; setting up of basic re-
quirements for the minimum facility and equipments con-
ditions; good Laboratory Practices in handling pathogenic 
biologic agents, transport, transfer and storage of samples, 
among other rules; implementing internal biosafety com-
mittees; compliance, reform or building of laboratory areas 
suited for Biosafety Level 3 (BSL3).
From 2000 on, 273 multipliers were capacitated, repre-
senting all the 27 Brazilian LACEN. 
Capacity building of college graduates on biosafety, 
aiming at the spread of different reference centers of pub-
lic health in Brazil, has resulted in a management and sur-
veillance policy. Making relevant information available and 
working out control and prevention risk strategies has start-
ed to be devised in Brazil. These graduates, upon returning 
to their original states, have set up a process of multiplying 
the information, still active up to now. At present, this pro-
gram has trained about 4,000 people.12
The SVS has been putting into force since 2005 the 
implementation of a network of BSL3 within the Nation-
al Public Health Laboratories Network. These lab BSL3 
areas are equipped for the development and performance 
of studies related to diagnosis and identification of risky 
biologic agents, such as Hantanvirus or the Anthrax bac-
teria.
These laboratory areas should be considered reference 
for Latin America, since they shall represent the strengthen-
ing of epidemiologic surveillance capacity within the whole 
region, especially for airborne diseases, caused by risk group 
three infectious agents.
At present, 13 BSL3 facilities are ready to use, as follows:
Instituto Adolfo Lutz/SES/SP.
Laboratório Central de Saúde Pública do Estado do 
Ceará/SES/CE
Laboratório Central de Saúde Pública do Distrito Fed-
eral/SES/DF
Centro de Referência Hélio Fraga/FIOCRUZ/RJ
Instituto Evandro Chagas/SVS/MS/PA
Instituto Octávio Magalhães/FUNED/SES/MG
Centro de Pesquisa Aggeu Magalhães/FIOCRUZ/PE
Laboratório Central de Saúde Pública do Estado do Rio 
Grande do Sul/SES/RS
Instituto Pasteur/SES/SP
Departamento de Virologia do IOC/FIOCRUZ/RJ
Instituto de Medicina Tropical/IMTM/SES/AM 
Centro de Pesquisa Gonçalo Muniz/FIOCRUZ/BA
Centro de Pesquisa em Medicina Tropical/CEPEM/SES/RO
Training and capacity building of the researchers that 
will work in the BSL3 areas has also started in 2005. The 
course is being ministered by professionals from FIOCRUZ 
and from Universidade de São Paulo.
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Since Brazil is a continent-sized country bordering al-
most all Latin American countries and bearing several bi-
omes, including those on the borders, still not completely 
known, it displays social and economic features that may 
render the country vulnerable to such risks. The lack of a 
chain of containment laboratories organized in a hierarchi-
cal manner and of a maximum containment laboratory, 
jeopardizes diagnostic activities, as the biological material is 
forwarded overseas, since investigations involving group 4 
biological agents cannot be made internally. This defi ciency 
also impacts the investments in technologies meant for the 
development of immunobiological and pharmacological 
products, as well as diagnostic inputs.
This work aims at discussing, through the data acquired 
from the Center for Strategic Information and Health Sur-
veillance (CIEVS), with the SVS; the epidemiologically-
relevant, notifi ed and collected events, from March 2006 
to April 2007; in order to support the need for setting up 
a maximum-containment laboratory unit in Brazil, based 
on the country’s particularities in epidemiological terms, its 
important biodiversity and its social and economic reality.
Center for strategic information and health 
surveillance
The CIEVS was founded in 2006, for the follow-up of diseases 
demanding compulsory reporting. It bears human and tech-
nological resources to carry out continuous collection and 
monitoring of epidemiological emergencies from a warning 
issued by the State Secretariat of Health (SES) and City De-
partment of Health, by practitioners or by health services all 
over the country. It provides support, within the health sur-
veillance scope, to the demands linked to the changes in the 
occurrence patterns of infectious diseases and in the trans-
mission dynamics of its agents, as well as to unusual cases, epi-
demiological emergency conditions of a biological, chemical 
or unknown nature, catastrophes and others which comprise 
outbreaks or epidemics. This information is immediately re-
ported to the SES and evaluated by the SVS, in order to con-
fi rm their epidemiological relevance.
The Ministry of Health published in 1999, with the pur-
pose of establishing criteria which would allow measuring 
the importance of a disease from a national surveillance per-
spective, a list of compulsory-notifi cation of diseases con-
stantly updated, following incorporation of new strategies 
and technologies. Thus, suspicious or confi rmed cases of the 
West Nile Fever and of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome 
(SARS) were included in the list, as from 2003, by Ordinance 
nº 2325. In 2005, Ordinance nº 33 inserted the cases of 
Creutzfeld-Jakob Disease (CJD), syphilis in pregnant wom-
en, Acute Febrile Icterohemorrhagic Syndrome, in addition 
to post-vaccination adverse events. In 2006, Ordinance nº 5 
made notifi cation of suspected or confi rmed Human Inﬂ u-
enza cases by a new subtype compulsory.13
Recently, the increase in number of morbid events, deemed 
emergent, whose etiology is unknown, led to the defi nition 
of “unusual diseases”, featured as the occurrence of cases or 
deaths by a disease of an unknown origin or cases of known 
diseases which display some alteration to their epidemiologi-
cal pattern. These cases are reported to the sanitary authorities 
independently of being found in the National List of Com-
pulsory Notifi cation Illnesses and Diseases. The inclusion of 
this concept strengthens the strategic dimension of the system 
in detecting events of an unknown origin or of development 
of diseases which deviate from an established pattern.
Ordinance nº 5 also presents a list of immediate noti-
fi cation illnesses and diseases which, on account of their 
high dissemination potential, or risks to public health, risk 
to peoples traffi c, high mortality and morbidity rate need 
follow-up by the Ministry of Health.13
 
METHODS
Data secured from the CIEVS, from March 2006 to the sec-
ond week of the month of April 2007 were analyzed. Data 
organization and analysis followed relevance criteria re-
garding the events reported and their relationship with the 
manifest or latent risk potential, pointing out to the discus-
sion on investments in Biosafety with regards to building up 
a maximum containment (BSL4) laboratory infrastructure 
and ensuring qualifi cation of health professionals, indicat-
ing the importance of the debate on the units location, ac-
cording to the reporting system.
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Presentation of results and their discussion were carried 
out in two ways: by the events (diseases, outbreaks, ill-
nesses or emergencies) and by chance (number of per-
sons affected by the event).
Numerical quantitative
Two hundred and forty-seven events were totalized in the 
covered period, 180 being in 2006 and 67 in 2007, with an 
average of four events per week. It was ascertained that June 
2006 was the record month in the number of reports.
In event systematization by number and by week and 
month, it was determined that the weeks: 1st in June, last in 
September; 1st in November and 3rd in December 2006 were 
those which displayed the greatest number of events, respec-
tively. The increase in frequency of reports in these weeks 
corresponds to the rainy season in the Northeast Region, 
which has set off an increase in ﬂ u syndrome, diarrhea and 
dengue fever cases in several capital cities. Average time be-
tween beginning of symptoms and notifi cation was 14 days, 
with an interval between 0 and 218 days (~7 months). It is 
important to point out that only 38% of the events reported 
display information on the beginning date of symptoms.
Health surveillance, biosafety and infectious diseases in Brazil
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Moreover, no events were reported in the 2nd, 3rd and 4th 
weeks of March 2006 and in the 3rd week of February 2007. 
It is assumed that the lack of reports in the fi rst weeks of 
March 2006 is related to the CIEVS putting-in-place phase.
Spatial distribution of events
Figure 1 presents the spatial distribution of events reported 
per Brazilian state. One observes that the states which bore 
the greatest number of events were as follows: SP (26), MG 
(25), BA (25), RJ (22) and PA (21). A greater epidemiologi-
cal framework is shown in the Southeast Region. Conversely, 
data in the North Region (AC, RR, RO and AP), where there 
is the occurrence of diseases of compulsory reporting as ar-
boviruses, displays underreporting. It is also important to 
point out the low level of event reporting in some Northeast 
Region states, such as AL and PB, and the total absence of 
events in SE, thus demonstrating defi ciency in the regional 
epidemiological surveillance system.
In the distribution of events per geographical region, 
one observes that the region with the greatest number of re-
ports is the Southeast (30.2%) – a result of SES operation as 
well as that of public health institutions of reference located 
therein. The Northeast Region, despite underreporting or 
total lack of reporting in some of its states, presents 27.2%, 
corresponding to the second region with the highest number 
of notifi cations. This percentage is due to the large number 
of reports in BA. The North Region, despite PA, having been 
the fi fth state in the number of reports, accounts for only 
16.6% of the reports. The South Region presents 13.2% and 
the Center-West Region 12.8%.
The low representativeness may stem from a trend to 
notify more serious cases, of those under hospital care and 
those which are being focused by the media at the expense of 
those displaying benign features, even though the latter may 
comprise the main sources of infection. 
According to the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention,14 underreporting is frequently associated to 
the lack of: knowledge from health professionals about 
the importance and the necessary reporting proce-
dures; knowledge of the list of diseases contemplated 
by the surveillance systems; motivation in compliance 
with reporting procedures, on account of the time 
consumed in filling out the cards and by the failure to 
return the analyzed information, with the pertinent 
technical recommendations; the health professionals’ 
concern referring to breach of data confidentiality, and 
to the professionals lack of awareness, regarding the 
public health relevance of the diseases submitted to sur-
veillance.
The participation of health professionals is a critical 
point in data collection quality; therefore, information 
given to these teams, highlighting the importance of dis-
ease notification toward service enhancement should be a 
priority in education and training. However, it is impor-
tant to point out that the adherence of health profession-
als to systematic notification is, for its most part, condi-
tioned to surveillance response, that is, to the frequency 
and speed with which it returns, to these professionals, 
analyzed information, added to technical recommenda-
tions applicable to the enhancement of health assistance 
services.
In Brazil, a way to reach wider participation of noti-
fying professionals would be the inclusion of the Com-
munity Health or National Family Health Agent Program 
in the logistic and practices of surveillance.
Another issue linked to underreporting is the exces-
sive emphasis given to medical assistance upon the ini-
tial phase of implementation of the Brazilian National 
Health Care System, at the expense of the health pro-
grams which bear as a feature being based on epidemio-
logical criteria so as to set up priorities.
Types of diseases
Figure 2 presents the types of diseases reported dur-
ing the period of research, which displayed the greatest 
number of events recorded. They were as follows:
Acute Chagas Disease – 22 events. Initially, this quan-
titative was related to a possible outbreak but it was ac-
tually deemed as a result of the improvement in disease 
surveillance, mainly in the North Region, where one 
finds cases of oral transmission through the ingestion of 
“açaí” in PA and AM.
Meningitis – 19 events, occurring mainly in 2006. The 
states of SP (6), MG (2) and PR (2) displayed the greatest 
number of cases.
Unknown-etiology syndromes – 18 events. The 
greatest number of events occurred in 2006 (15 events). 
During the period reviewed, the events displayed great-
er distribution in the Southeast (7), Northeast (6) and 
North (3).
Figure 1: Distribution of disease events reported to CIEVS, 
according to the State, from March 2006 to May 2007.
Number of
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A change to the outlook is ascertained upon the group-
ing of events by great categories of pathologies, in which ex-
anthematic diseases (lumping together  Measles, Rubella and 
Varicella) have become the group with the greatest number of 
events in the period reviewed (27). This is due to the fact of 
the Rubella outbreaks in the States of MG and RJ and of Mea-
sles in BA. The arboviruses (lumping together Dengue fever, 
Hemorrhagic Dengue Fever, Yellow Fever, Wild-Type Yellow 
Fever, Saint Louis encephalitis, hemorrhagic fevers, and Oro-
pouche Fever) start to display a signifi cant number of occur-
rences (20). Finally, respiratory syndromes (lumping together 
Inﬂ uenza events, SARS, respiratory syndromes, specifi c cases 
of suspected H5N1 and epizooties (death of birds) related to 
these) also display a representative number (16). It is impor-
tant to highlight that prion diseases (diseases caused by prions 
and CJD) presented nine occurrences.
Risk of etiological agent involved in the event reported
Brazil classifi es the etiological agents according to their risk in 
order to relate them to Biosafety recommendations. This classifi -
cation groups up the biological agents in four risk classes, grow-
ing in the degree of containment and complexity in the level of 
protection.15 It is an important instrument to support risk assess-
ment, which shall determine practices and procedures for the 
handling of infections agents and materials, safety equipment 
and engineering and architectural aspects of the environments. It 
is important to point out that any information about the handled 
biological agent which may lead to alterations in virulence pat-
terns, pathogenicity, antibiotic resistance or other factors, shall 
imply in stricter containment criteria.
Distinction between risk groups of pathogens involved 
in the events reported was performed by means of the na-
tional biological agent risk classifi cation,15 thus leading to 
Figure 3. The diseases which did not have their etiological 
agent diagnosed are named as “unknown”.
One observes the predominance of diseases whose etiologi-
cal agent belongs to risk group 2, thus ascertaining that most 
etiological agents handled in the Country fall in this group 
(72% of the events), such as Rubella, Measles, Dengue Fever, 
Meningococcal Meningitis, Chagas disease and Inﬂ uenza vi-
ruses, which have caused the highest number of occurrences.
The etiological agents classifi ed as group 3 are represented 
along the period reviewed with a steady frequency and aver-
age, and account for 19% of the events reported. This group 
comprises Hantaviruses, prions (registered as prionic diseases 
and CJD), the cases of wild-type Yellow Fever and Botulism. 
Health professionals handling materials suspected of contain-
ing agents of this risk group should be mandatorily protected 
as to the risk of airborne transmission. They have to use, among 
personal protection equipment, respiratory protection masks 
with greater fi ltering effectiveness (N95- fi ltering effectiveness 
of 95% of the particles up to 0.3 µ). Considering the risk to pro-
fessionals, public health and to the environment, the amount 
of events whose etiological agents are unknown is signifi cant 
(9% of the events reported). These are also of frequent occur-
rence throughout the period reviewed. These events appears as 
an important indicator for the professionals as upon absence of 
specifi c information on the etiological agent of the outbreak, 
the professionals have to be ready to perform risk assessment 
correctly, by using the biological agent risk classifi cation as a 
Figure 2: Number of disease events reported to CIEVS, in the 
country, from March 2006 to April 2007.
Figure 3: Disease Events reported to CIEVS, in the country, 
from March 2006 to May 2007, shown by month and year, 
according to the etiologic agent’s risk classification group or 
diagnosed disease.
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guideline in order to establish appropriate preventive and 
containment measures to be carried out. These events should 
be worked on within maximum containment conditions, as 
they are pathogens which do not bear information on their 
forms of transmission, thereby increasing the risk. This dem-
onstrates the importance of qualifi cation of the professionals 
involved, regarding the containment and control measures of 
the related risks.
Strengthening of this competence is decisive and is a precon-
dition for the epidemiological surveillance program. This shall 
occur through the qualifi cation of the professionals involved, 
allowing recognition of the new pathogenic agents and diseases 
and fast intervention so as to defi ne prompt and appropriate 
strategies. Moreover, there is still the need for implementation 
of improvements to hospital conditions and to the training of 
professionals dedicated to the assistance to suspected patients, 
and confi rmed cases of pathogens of epidemiological relevance 
and risk of spreading, or cause of an emerging disease which 
becomes epidemiologically important or whose transmission 
mechanism is unknown.
As depicted at Figure 4, in 2006, the number of diseases 
whose etiological causes of agents of an unknown origin  was 
almost four times as much as the number of diseases whose 
etiological agents belonged to risk group 3. Conversely, in 2007 
(by April), the number of cases of these two categories had 
matched. The data, in the cases of diseases of unknown origin, 
demonstrate need for an effective health surveillance system, 
involving analysis of the outbreaks and fi eld epidemiological 
investigation with the purpose of locating the transmission 
chain links. Frequently, in the unusual outbreaks, there is need 
for exhaustive investigation, as they involve agents, causal fac-
tors, unknown forms of transmission and dissemination and 
the number of persons afﬂ icted may be high.
Certain epidemic events, which are featured as abnormal 
situations, are depicted to the community as potentially serious, 
and tend to trigger social pressures. Thus, they need to be ad-
equately treated, which demands solutions from the authorities 
as expeditiously as possible, thereby conditioning the pace and 
conditions of the course of their investigation.
Prevention of new cases is priority in the ongoing outbreaks. 
The investigation should concentrate itself on the extent and 
size of the event and on the features of the population at risk, 
so as to outline and develop appropriate control measures. In 
case the epidemic is already close to its end, one should prevent 
the appearance of new cases. Here, investigation should aim, 
especially, at identifying the factors which have contributed to 
the occurrence of the event.
When the outbreak is of unknown cause, source and 
form of transmission, the disease is serious and the develop-
ment of the investigation shall allow for its identifi cation. 
Control actions can and should be taken, empirically, prior 
to its conclusion. However, there are certain situations in 
which control actions can only be implemented following 
exhaustive investigations. Seriousness of the event is a factor 
conditioning urgency in the course of investigation and in 
the implementation of control measures.
All professionals involved in the epidemiological inves-
tigation of an outbreak need to know the risks which they 
are exposed to. Soares16 points out that those professionals 
need to have an understanding of the epidemiological struc-
ture of the biological agents, including sources of infection 
and routes of transmission, as these factors comprise fun-
damental determinants in the prevention and reduction of 
contamination risk by environmental or biological sources 
during work performance.
An outbreak investigation involves a prior evaluation of the 
risks found in the work stages, from the planning and handling 
of infecting materials to the conditions for program perform-
ance, requiring training and discipline, as any failure can lead 
to contamination by direct or indirect contact with pathogenic 
material.
Figure 5 presents the number of cases occurring in 
each event reported, per month and year, of the illnesses 
whose etiological agents belong to risk group 3, and of 
Figure 4: Number of disease cases reported to CIEVS, in the 
country, from March 2006 to May 2007, caused by group risk 
3 infectious agents and those by unknown agents.
Figure 5: Number of disease cases reported to CIEVS, in the 
country, from March 2006 to May 2007, caused by group risk 
3 infectious agents and unknown agents.
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the diseases which have not had their etiological agent di-
agnosed yet (unknown).The high number of cases in the 
month of March was due to an unknown-etiology disease, 
albeit restricted to ophthalmologic symptoms, in the city of 
Araguatins (TO). This event, by its symptoms, demonstrated 
not having stemmed from a high pathogenic agent.
One should assign special importance to the cases 
reported in April, as they displayed symptoms of acute 
respiratory insufficiency, with blood spillage from the 
airways and cardiac-pulmonary syndrome (occurring in 
Natal (RN) and Alta Floresta (MT) respectively). These 
events depict symptoms which evidence airborne trans-
mission, enhancing the risk.
There are factors related to infectious diseases in 
epidemic outbreaks which determine differentiated Bi-
osafety procedures during epidemiological investigation. 
The one pertaining to the natural history of the disease, 
which covers the knowledge of disease evolution in the 
individual, stands out. Normally, one ascertains a period 
of anatomical or functional changes which highlight the 
subclinical or unapparent phase, which culminates with 
the beginning of the symptoms (incubation period). 
However, although diseases are unapparent during the 
incubation period, a number of pathological changes 
can be detected during this phase by means of labora-
tory methods, although most of the time diagnosis may 
only come up through symptoms. This fact is exacerbated 
by the instance that a considerable portion of the cases 
remains below the clinical horizon and, therefore, are 
not identified by their symptoms. Waldman17 points out 
still that “the higher the proportion of unapparent cases, 
the greater will be the difficulties to learn the infections 
processes, and to identify the main responsible agents for 
disease transmission within the community, as known 
cases represent only the tip of the iceberg”. This shows 
that the possibility of a disease whose etiological agent is 
unknown and with a long period of incubation, transmit-
ted by airborne agents is quite high. Thus, there is need 
for immediate implementation of control and prophylax-
is methods in the region affected, such as isolating cases 
during the transmissibility period (when known); meas-
ures aiming at preventing or mitigating the disease, its 
complications and consequences; quarantine or isolation 
of the healthy population (human or animal) follow-up 
of the reported cases following the date of the last contact 
with an infected person. Compliance with the Biosafety 
principles is of paramount importance at all stages of epi-
demiological investigation, in the sense of preventing the 
spreading of pathogens; the capture, handling and safe 
transport of biological samples; assistance to the popula-
tion affected and protection to the professional himself, 
so that the latter does not become a spreading source of 
the pathogenic agent.
Figure 6 presents the total cases of diseases reported 
caused by etiological agents from risk group 3 and un-
known, per region, and per Brazilian state, in the period 
reviewed. The following was observed in data analysis:
Diseases with unknown etiological agent:
The North Region displays the highest number of 
these diseases (80.4%) – the city of Araguatins (TO) pre-
sented the highest number of cases, albeit restricted to 
ophthalmological symptoms, with 306 cases of persons 
affected in March 2006, with no deaths. There was also 
an outbreak in this region, in the city of Novo Reparti-
mento (PA), affecting 9 persons, with 6 deaths.
The Northeast Region concentrates, next, the highest 
number of these occurrences (8.4%). It is important to 
point out the RN outbreak with 26 persons affected, in 
the city of Natal, in April 2006, with acute respiratory 
failure and bleeding in the airways, in which there were 
6 deaths.
There were two outbreaks in the Southeast Region; 
one, in RJ (Campos dos Goytacazes), in December, af-
fecting 5 persons with 4 deaths and another outbreak in 
MG (Frei Gaspar), in December, affecting 9 persons with 
4 deaths. The total reported cases in this region placed it 
in the third position in the number of cases (6.9%).
Despite the Central West Region not presenting 
a high percentage of reports (4.0%), we should high-
light the outbreak in the city of Alta Floresta (MT), in 
April, affecting 15 children in the 2-to-5-month-old age 
bracket, with 100% of deaths with cardiovascular syn-
drome symptoms.
Diseases caused by biological agents of risk group 3 
biological agents:
The Central West Region presented the highest 
number (43.5%) - MT reported, in the city of Campo 
Novo do Parecis, an outbreak of hantaviruses, affecting 
39 persons with 5 deaths.
Figure 6: Number of cases reported to CIEVS, in Brazil, from 
March 2006 to May 2007, caused by diseases involving group 
risk 3 infectious agents and unknown, shown by State /
Region.
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The Southeast region was the second region in 
number of reports (37.6%) – the city of Campinas (SP), 
presented an outbreak of Spotted Fever, in August 2006, 
affecting 19 persons with 3 deaths, and the city of Caeté 
(MG), displayed another outbreak of Spotted Fever af-
fecting 15 persons with one death.
By correlating the information on the number of re-
ported diseases, per state, with the number of cases of 
persons affected by diseases involving risk group 3 etio-
logical and unknown agents, one observes that, despite SP 
having presented the highest number of diseases reported 
in the period reviewed, it was not the state affected by 
diseases caused by etiological agents of higher epidemio-
logical impact (risk group 3 or unknown). This means 
that the total number of events, even if it is significant, 
may not be of epidemiological relevance, regarding the 
spreading risk, transmissibility, and lethal potential, in 
the same way as a reduced number of events, but which 
have a significant quantitative incidence.
Figure 7 was built to show the country’s geographic dis-
tribution of diseases caused by unknown etiological agents.
important that RN and DF have only presented the report 
of one case whose outcome was death. The states of BA, TO 
and SP have presented cases of diseases of unknown etiol-
ogy; however, these cases led to no deaths.
Out of a total of 392 cases of diseases whose etiologi-
cal agents were unknown, 53 deaths were ascertained, that 
is, 13.5% of lethality, which is representative and which ex-
presses the need for a deeper evaluation of their causes.
Figure 8 shows a spatial distribution of the lethality rate 
of diseases, thereby demonstrating that there has been no 
concentration in any region.
 
Figure 7: Distribution of cases reported to CIEVS, with 
unknown etiologic agents, according to the State, from 
March 2006 to May 2007.
Lethality
The measurement of disease frequency and of deaths comprises 
a prerequisite for professionals developing routine surveillance 
activities and outbreak investigation. It is fundamental that this 
measurement is performed in the appropriate manner, so as to 
allow the featuring of risk of a specifi c disease to the population 
or estimate the magnitude of the health problem.17
Figure 8 data show the rate of lethality of reported dis-
eases of unknown agents. The states of MT, MA, PE, ES, 
RS and DF stand out with 100% of lethality. However, it is 
CONCLUSION
The context of the issues discussed in this study clearly shows 
the need for awareness in Biosafety in the health surveillance 
practices, especially in epidemiological investigations in Brazil.
The emergence and re-emergence of infectious diseases are 
phenomena which represent a constant and powerful force of 
nature, with the important participation of human behavior 
and its relationship with the environment. The occurrence of 
these diseases challenges the epidemiological investigations and 
public health as a whole. One of these challenges refers to Biose-
curity and to Biosafety.
The hazards facing risk agents, most of the times of an un-
known nature, requires that multidisciplinary teams be quali-
fi ed to identify and appraise risks, so that prevention and con-
trol measures apply to the elimination or minimization of these 
risks, either for the professionals or for the environment.
At times, the investigation of an outbreak which presents 
itself initially as routine, may lead to the characterization 
of a disease hitherto unknown, as well as of its agents, 
sources and/or mode of transmission and control meas-
ures, representing high risk to the professionals involved 
Figure 8: Distribution of lethality rates and fatal cases, 
reported to CIEVS, with unknown etiologic agents, according 
to the State, from March 2006 to May 2007.
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in the investigation and which could only be handled under 
maximum containment conditions. We mention, as an exam-
ple, the characterization of the legionnaire’s disease and of the 
acquired immunodefi ciency syndrome, when an outbreak of 
pneumonia was being investigated, and which afﬂ icted a group 
of individuals belonging to a North American Civil organiza-
tion named “American Legion”, and another outbreak of pneu-
monia by Pneumocystis carinii among young homosexuals. In 
Brazil, the Brazilian purpuric fever, is another example, indi-
vidualized as a new disease framework, during the investigation 
of a fulminans purpuric outbreak, which occurred in the mu-
nicipality of Promissão (SP), affecting children below 10 years 
of age, with high rate of lethality, not associated to infection by 
Neisseria meningitidis and by H. infl uenzae type B, which had, 
until then evidently determined this syndrome.
It is necessary, in confronting outbreaks, to dispose of, or 
feature changes to disease, agent source or mode of transmission 
behavior. This is what happened, in the 1980’s, with the polio-
virus type 3 epidemics, which affected the Brazilian Northeast. 
The possibility of the poliovirus to comprise a mutant virus 
was investigated, as the population involved in the episode was 
supposedly immunized. There is still the risk that new, highly-
lethal etiological agents, multi-drug-resistant agents, the use of 
genetic engineering techniques in the mutation of pathogen 
genes, causes changes in features (stability, virulence, spread-
ing property etc.), leading to the possibility of their being used 
as biological weapons, which has been mobilizing the security 
forces of developed countries.18 However, even more important 
than this danger is the quite real possibility of global traffi c of 
viruses in a few hours, from a continent, by means of air trips.
Taking into account the scientifi c and technological re-
sources, in which Biosafety originally built and consolidated its 
attraction the BSL3 laboratories are used for the study of bio-
logical agents which are potentially lethal, transmissible by aer-
osols, and which require specifi c secondary barriers, for greater 
containment, such as a specialized air system. The BSL4 labora-
tories are normally used for the study of lethal biological agents, 
whose treatment or immunoprophylaxis does not exist. They 
incorporate the specifi city of containment of the BSL3 added to 
additional containment barriers such as positive pressure cloth-
ing with life support systems. Generally, Biosafety precautions 
are determined by the risk of biological agents handled and the 
type of assay to be developed. However, risk assessment has to 
be performed prior to activity performance, in which aspects 
pertaining to the workers themselves are taken into considera-
tion. Additional security protection may be necessary, at any 
level of Biosafety, from 1 to 4, depending on the specifi c needs 
of the assay to be developed.
The National Institutes of Health reports the existence 
of 277 BSL3 laboratories in the USA, until 2005.19 However, 
we have been facing a growth in the number of these types 
of laboratories throughout the world. A number of BSL3 
laboratories have been built, and went into operation in 
2006: in India (16 new laboratories), Thailand (5), Indo-
nesia (2), Bangladesh (1), and Myanmar (1).20 The increase 
in the number of BSL3, as well as the BSL4 laboratories is 
due, especially, to the increment of research and adequacy 
requirements of these research works to the Biosafety and 
Biosecurity rules.
Brazil’s great biodiversity variety includes etiologi-
cal disease agents, able to cause damage to public health 
and to the environment and which could be used for the 
development of biological weapons. The Brazilian Sabiá 
virus is an example. 
To face this new situation, so that one may ensure a 
minimum of self-support to the National Health System, 
it is indispensable that the following instruments to public 
health practices are incorporated:
 Surveillance in public health, in the epidemiological 
intelligence sense, as an induction instrument for 
research, for strategies of disease control and incor-
poration of the knowledge produced;
 Epidemiological and laboratory research;
 Health services organized in a way to incorporate 
regularly, in an agile manner, new knowledge and 
technologies indispensable to the continuous elab-
oration, evaluation and reformulation of strategies 
for disease control, considering Biosafety among 
them on a priority basis.
The discussion developed evidences the complexity 
which is being drawn up in the Biosafety fi eld as this fi eld 
works and establishes interlocutions with the fi eld of appli-
cation of technologies, biological agent manipulation and 
the important and growing demand for risk control.
It is important to mention that the process of develop-
ment of vaccines and pharmaceutical products starts with 
the understanding of the biology of the biological agents 
involved and the pathogenesis of the disease they cause. 
Many of these studies should be performed at BSL3 or 4, 
and at containment laboratories, for the growth process of 
the organism and extraction of its nucleic acid and pro-
teins. The transmission, disease progression, and effective-
ness of drugs and vaccines are performed with in vivo as-
says of high complexity and containment.
Research investments must assign priority to areas such 
as: the development of laboratory techniques of diagnostic 
kits; knowledge of the magnitude and dispersion of dis-
eases and their risk factors; elucidation of the transmission 
chain links; explanation for the resistance phenomena to 
medications or to insecticides, development and evaluation 
of new vaccines and drugs. The existence of laboratory fa-
cilities which bear appropriate containment requirements 
(including BSL4), well structured and trained professional 
teams for diagnosis, well structured and trained, and a well 
defi ned, easily accessible laboratory hierarchy are necessary 
for such purpose.
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